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Political Rectitude |
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| WE have been considering the society as proceeding by consensus, reaching agreement on every point, one after another. Must all questions be treated in this way? Let us consider what kinds of questions there are. Some kinds of questions are to be solved by following precedent. Some are not ¾ there are questions where we hope to find better answers as time goes by. It might be remarked that this distinction, between decisions which are and decisions which are not settled by precedent, is far from obvious. "Primitive" societies are those which still proceed by consensus in all instances. One might speculate that "decadent" societies are those which fail to follow precedent where it is appropriate. Some questions have many answers which may all be equally good. Where there are many possible answers, there is apparently no method of arriving at the "right" answer ¾ but it may plausibly be the case that what is important is, not that the answer should be right, but that everyone should know what answer has been adopted: do you yield to those on your right/starboard or left/port? Thus there exist political questions, which affect all of the people equally but nevertheless do not require a consensus. The political question cannot be handled in the manner of polite society, by posing a question and deferring to any objection. If the question "Is A the best man?" fails to gain a majority in favor, then the question "Is B the best man?" is prejudiced by the circumstance that some persons have already declared themselves to believe A better than B. This is, of course, a familiar problem; the result of seeking a consensus is to choose a mediocrity (one whom, possibly, none of the voters would have held to be the best.) The solution to the problem is also familiar; it is the ballot, every member votes for one (or more) out of a number of options. If any one candidate has a majority, it follows that he is favored by more persons than favor all the other candidates put together; he is ¾ whether he be good or bad ¾ the best man. There is an assumption hidden here, namely that all the voters know the candidate equally well. Otherwise, we are not entitled to assume that the majority will be right, because those who know the candidate well are ¾ presumably ¾ fewer than those who know him only slightly. However, we can establish the necessary conditions for all those voting to know the candidates adequately; if the voters meet together and discuss the candidates, those who know little about A will learn from those who know A well, and similarly with respect to B. A political decision, by definition, is not momentous; if it turns out to be mistaken, it can be changed, because it does not set (nor follow) any precedent. The society which is appearing before us involves numerous other decisions which, far from setting precedents, one would hope to improve from time to time ¾ such as, for instance, how much money to collect in taxes each year. It has been argued that a justiciable decision ¾ one establishing a precedent ¾ requires a consensus, whereas a political decision ¾ a choice between options of equal merit ¾ can be made by a mere majority. These two classes do not, however, exhaust the scope of public acts. What other decisions are there which can be made by some, rather than all, of the entities? One is, to answer any question which has the nature of a political question ¾ that it is more important that everyone know the answer, than what the answer may be ¾ but is made for all time. It does not really matter how one stakes a claim, it matters that there be but one manner of staking a claim: it does not really matter how the clocks compare with Greenwich Mean Time, but it matters that all of the clocks are reading the same time: it does not really matter whether one passes to the left or the right of a vehicle, or vessel, on a collision course, but it matters that everyone know when to yield the right of way. No one can show that such decisions were right; but neither can anyone have any grounds for asking that they be reviewed. Such decisions might be described as regulations: a claim marked in some manner other than the regulation manner may well be good, even though it is irregular, a clock which always reads one hour slow or two hours fast is perfectly good but irregular. Regulations (and standards ¾ such as, whether the gallon contains eight pounds five ounces or ten pounds of water) are typical of the decisions which a majority is competent to make. Moreover, we can see that there are other accords which do not require even a majority to effect. A sovereign is not bound by any convention which he has not freely accepted ¾ but he can invoke a convention which others have made. A and B can create a trust in favor of C, even if C is not an equal (C may be an incompetent). E can bequeath his assets to F, without his consent or even knowledge. And G can announce that the public is free to walk across the grass, or even to picnic, on his property. We perceive the principle which pervades these examples: a majority, or even a minority, is entirely competent to act for the benefit of the remainder. It appears, then, that there are two quite different cases in which a majority can act. The first is to make a political decision or regulation ¾ a choice between options of equal merit, and affecting the minority equally with the majority. The second is to make a beneficent declaration, in favor of the minority ¾ one that is proper or "politically correct." Privileges
We have assumed that justiciable decisions ¾ those establishing a precedent ¾ are made by consensus. Is it reasonable that the law be changed without a consensus, by only a majority? It is quite conceivable that some change might be favorable to a minority, but costless to the majority. A conspicuous example is intellectual property. Law gives no redress to one whose words or ideas are used by another: an idea does not suffer wear or degradation in use, the originator is no worse off as a result of being copied. If the privilege of patent or copyright protection is created, then the minority of original minds are better off . . . but the majority are no worse off; rather, they too may well be better off, because effort and time will be devoted to making innovations that can be protected. Similarly, law gives no protection to a debtor; the question of how much D owes to P is determined by the circumstances, and quite unaffected by the instance that D owns only so many assets. If the privilege of bankruptcy is created, the minority who are unable to meet their obligations are better off . . . but the majority too may well be better off, because individuals will be more ready to take risks today in the hope of gains tomorrow. (Only may be better off ¾ protecting bankers from feeling the pain of loss may result in injudicious lending . . . .) Such privileges are distinct from law, which can be discovered and justified in the moot or by stare decisis ; they are the result of legislation, in one or another community. Conflict of Interest
Our theory of society has been based upon the principle that all persons equally are to agree in whatsoever is done. But if the majority can act in favor of the minority, then, obviously, all are not equally interested. In some instances, this may not be a problem. No-one knows whether he will invent his own solution or use another persons solution; no-one knows whether he will be able to meet all his obligations on every future date. The privileges of patents and bankruptcy are valuable equally to all, at least if we are considering the (genuinely) political question whether to institute them at some uncertain future date. If, in contrast, it is proposed that there be a public institution for the benefit of the insane, the situation is quite different. The insane are a distinct minority (so thoroughly distinct, of course, that they do not vote.) But there is another minority who are benefitted, those who perform the function; they are transformed from being the servants of the few who are guardians of patients to being the servants of the public. This means that their success or failure with each patient becomes less important; indeed, failing to cure the patients may be more rewarding, in terms of budget funding, than curing them. Thus there is a distinction between privileges and special privileges; the former resemble political questions ¾ no-one particularly favors one answer rather than another ¾ and thus can be created by a mere majority (but this is not to say that they can be changed by a majority ¾ at any moment in time, some people will be creditors and some will be debtors.) Special privileges do not affect all equally, and are not to be created by a majority of the whole community; some of the people will be uninterested or slightly interested, others will be keenly interested. Again, if some property is owned collectively, and some individually, then the persons whose livings are derived from the collective property are at a social disadvantage; legislation is more important to them than to the private persons. The collective property may be risked, or neglected (where individual property would be conserved) because some are disinterested in it. Or, in the alternative, it may be that the public servants organize and vote more regularly than the private persons, so that the former are at an advantage. It should be observed that, if the society is not a republic ¾ if the guardians of public property expect to continue so to act beyond the next election ¾ they may disapprove of the relative success of private ownership, since it would suggest that the public should divest itself of property; they might well advocate that public ownership (or, at least, management) should be extended, so that all properties are subject to equally disinterested management. If the society does not exclude all special privileges, then plainly it needs to recognize that all persons are not equally entitled to be heard. Those who benefit from the existence of special privileges should not be enfranchised. And, of course, if special privileges are to exist, then it suddenly becomes greatly more important that the society protect the rights of every member. There will be minorities with an interest in influencing the votes of the members; attempts to coerce, or to bribe, or to deceive voters must be anticipated. Constitutional Government
We have seen that some part of the whole may make agreements without the consent of the remainder ¾ if the agreements are in favor of the remainder. This opens the possibility that an agreement made today may continue into the future, even after the parties who made it are deceased. There is the possibility of setting up an institution with an indefinite span of life. Thus, conceivably, there can be such a thing as constitutional government ¾ a government which continues to exist through one lifetime after another, but nevertheless has consent to its existence. Majority Rule
We have seen that, even in a society that exists to defend the individual, there may well be majority rule. However, the majority may act only for all equally, or in favor of the minority. And if there are to be any special privileges, then those favored are to be excluded from voting. If what is today termed "political correctness" does not prevail, then the society is susceptible to being shattered, either rapidly by the policies advocated by the Left (viz. voting favors to the majority) or gradually by those practised by the Right (oppressing the minority.)
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