LET us now see whether the Articles of Amendment ¾ all of which have been submitted by Congress and therefore required only three fourths of the States for ratification ¾ correspond to the rights of citizens, or counties, or States.

Article I. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

It is today supposed that these are strikingly valuable provisions, defining the proper powers of governments. In fact, at the time of ratification it was not considered improper for governments to support one or another religion (a "Left" transgression, the majority voting a privilege in its own favor); thus the first provision merely affirms that the States alone have this power.

However, there are countless other powers which the States have and the U. S. does not, e. g. the power to give effect to bequests. Why are these not also specified? There can be but one answer. This "amendment" was advocated under the misapprehension that the U. S., even as a State, has rights, i.e. can act where it is not prohibited.

If the States themselves did not have the power to prohibit religion, abridge the freedom of speech or of the press, etc. ¾ and it is hard to imagine any people agreeing that they did not have the right to worship, to assemble, to petition ¾ then they cannot be supposed to have delegated such a power to the U. S.

Thus the words after "establishment of religion" change nothing in the Constitution, add nothing to it, clarify nothing in it. They have no relevance.

But ¾ far from strange to relate ¾ the courts have labored to give these provisions some meaning, and have given them the meaning that Congress "may" pass laws which prohibit anything other than the free exercise of religion, which abridge freedoms other than those of speech or the press, or abridge rights of the people peaceably to do things other than assemble or petition . . . . What else can these provisions mean? Why mention freedom of speech, unless it is different from other freedoms?

The meaning that there is some barrier, or some gulf, between the government and the church, or the government and the press, is also false. There will certainly be some laws governing what may or may not be printed ¾ such is the essence of copyright. And, while the Congress will have nothing to say about religion, the church will have a great deal to say about government; who

Article II. A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.

The words "A well-regulated militia . . . free State," are the key to interpreting this amendment. What does the State have to do with the militia? We remember, from Art. I, Sec. 8, that the States reserved the right to appoint the officers. The first clause means, " . . . security of a free State against the United States." Accordingly, the last clause means " . . . shall not be infringed by the Congress." The Congress is authorized to write regulations governing the militia; this amendment is the safeguard against its

Article III. No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

This amendment is enlightening. It does indeed prevent the Congress from resorting to compulsory billeting of soldiers in time of peace. But the words "prescribed by law" show that it is a safeguard against wrongdoing, not by Congress, but by individual officers. Thus the amendment suggests that the States intended to forestall transgressions, not so much by their elected representatives, as by mere officers.

Article IV. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

This amendment again makes sense only if read as a restraint upon U. S. judges, who might well issue warrants to search imported goods for the purpose of levying duties. But it makes no sense at all as an attempt to define the proper powers of the U. S.; words such as "unreasonable", "probable", "particularly", are words to be weighed by juries today or tomorrow, they do not serve to tell the next generation what we have determined.

Article V. No person shall be held to answer for a capital or other infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service, in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.

All of these wrongs, too, are such as are done by individual judges or prosecutors. If we forbid the judges to act other than by "due process of law", then indeed we mean by "law" the legislation which we have written to settle, in advance of the event, what our officers shall do: if we try and make the words a description of what Congress is authorized to do, then "due process of law" is turned on its head, it comes to mean the proper manner of depriving a person of liberty or property.

It is important to note that, hitherto, the Constitution has given no hint of "jeopardy of life" even in the case of treason ¾ now the Congress is stressing, three times in this one amendment, that it may take life! (The king’s judges had indeed had this power ¾ the colonists were, very often, persons who had been spared by the judges from dying ignominiously at the king’s hands ¾ so that the amendment would make excellent sense against judges not bound by law.)

Article VI. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.

Once again, these strictures make good sense against lawless judges, but not against the legislature; Congress has already been required to provide trial by jury for "all crimes", and to specify where a trial shall be if the crime did not occur in any State (Art. III, Sec. 2.) It should go without saying that the reason why it is important that the accused have a trial where he chose to commit the crime is, that the jury has the right to pass upon, not only the facts, but the law as set forth by the Congress; thus the people most concerned should hear the case.

Article VII. In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States than according to the rules of the common law.

This amendment confirms that Congress was happily introducing amendments directed against a different branch of government, the judiciary. However, it makes two significant points. First, it strongly implies that what is regulated by Congress, viz. the value of the dollar, is expected to remain the same, even though it is the judicial and not the legislative branch which proceeds by following precedent. Second, it implies that "common law" was understood and approved by the States ¾ that the judges are indeed expected to test the law by making their decisions consistent with those of other courts.

Article VIII. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

All of this makes sense only if read as a restraint on the judges. (English judges were so fond of cruel punishments that a felon had been known to petition the king for a death sentence!) However, it is Congress, not the courts, that has been authorized to punish treason, piracy, counterfeiting . . . punishments are to be known to all, and not depend upon the discretion of a mere appointee.

Article IX. The enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

This amendment does clarify the Constitution as it stood ¾ it should have served to prevent the judges conceding to Congress all powers not prohibited in the First, Second, and Fourth-through-Eighth Amendments.

If we have established a democracy, in which the U. S. does only what it is told, then there is no fear of it violating the rights of the States. And, since the States are to have a republican form of government, they could be expected to be jealous of the rights of their citizens: the delegated power to punish piracy is an acknowledgement of the freedom of the people to sail the high seas, the delegated power to punish counterfeiting is an acknowledgement of the right of the people to exchange money for securities.

In the skeptical milieu of the ‘90s, it is debatable whether the rights implied by the Ninth Amendment are to be honored by the judges of the U. S: "original intent" is regarded as but one among other theories of judicial decision. The answer is, of course, simple; that the judges of the U. S. are not expected to construe the Constitution by intuition ¾ they are expected to follow the precedents set by the States.

Article X. The powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

This too is a clarification, but not necessary: it was pointless to authorize Congress to punish treason, piracy, counterfeiting (and to limit the punishment of treason) unless these provisions meant that Congress was without power to punish any other crimes. The twelve amendments submitted to the States in 1789 included one holding that "All political power is inherent in the people . . ." ¾ possibly the reason it was not ratified was that the same thing had been said so many times.

Article XI. The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States, by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State.

The popular belief is, that this is just another of the h