YOU will find, I dare to say, that your State has two governments. The first is that sanctioned by its Constitution. It is republican: the governor, secretary, attorney, treasurer, justices are elected regularly. It works from, perhaps, eight-thirty until five, five days a week, excluding several holidays. It does the same things today as it has done in the past ¾ holding elections, trying cases, recording deeds, assessing property ¾ or, if not, the changes were discussed at great length in public before being effected. No-one thinks it is clever or discriminating, but hardly anyone (except those aspiring to hold office) thinks it is worthy of their attention. It is a responsive (democratic) government: the marshal knocks on the door, he does not knock down the door; the receiver does not push his way in, and stick his fingers in the till, until after you have lost your case in open court.

There are, I must admit, exceptions: the Constitution of Nevada authorizes the State to institute a prison. (It does not, I hasten to add, authorize the prison to kill or otherwise mistreat the inmates entrusted to it by the counties.)

The other government, not authorized by the counties, is initiative (aristocratic.) Its officers are appointed, sometimes for indefinite terms. This government never sleeps or rests. One reads the papers, or listens to the news, largely to find out what this government has just done; its method is, act first and [perhaps] go to court later. It seizes banks with no notice. It padlocks buildings without the owner’s consent. It decides how children should be brought up. It demands to be paid in advance before one uses the public highway, and ¾ despite being a monopoly ¾ claims the right to refuse service. Knowing the strategies and tactics of this threatening, abusive government is an immensely valuable gift.

The motive force of this government is unconcealed. It is, to establish that the government, equally with the citizens, is entitled to kill persons, to destroy property, even to bring suit. The only acts it recognizes as wrong are crimes against the state.

This kind of government has been known for centuries in the Old World. The Europeans had the idea that the governor need not be merely a servant with no, or even a negative, interest in doing well, and thus requiring constant, vigilant oversight. Instead, he could have the strongest conceivable interest in doing well ¾ he could be allowed to call the land, and even the people, his own! In a word, he should be an autocrat.

What would prevent His Majesty from pillaging the community? Nothing. But, if the king were one among many kings, he would be concerned that his kingdom be strong enough to resist attack by other kings ¾ therefore, he would hesitate to lay waste his realm, he would confine himself to tax rates that would not shut businesses down. (The theory was, that the "social contract" had been made by the people collectively, not individually: therefore, the king could take everyone’s land, everyone’s houses, everyone’s horses, but could not take one person’s land, one person’s house, one person’s horse. However, kings easily escaped this restriction by claiming that they could seize the property of outlaws: consequently, having a king meant not only a perpetual threat from foreign powers, but also perpetual danger from those whom the king chose to call "criminals.") In any case, even the most extravagant monarch is relatively inexpensive, compared to the cost of fighting a war . . . if the system had resulted in the country enjoying peace, it would have been attractive as an expedient.

Forfeiture is not a new problem. Magna Carta , 32, provides: "We [the King of England] shall not hold the lands of those convicted of felony longer than a year and a day . . . ."

And, after it had been noticed that kings rather regularly went mad, it was accepted that at least some part of the people had the right to challenge, remove and replace the king. The system was watered down to aristocracy . . . . Not that aristocracy was a great improvement; the king ruling alone did have the incentive that he might acquire a reputation, and even be remembered after his death, as a Good King, but the nobles might well think only in the short term (from here to the grave.)

But it was not the aristocratic system that resulted in peace, if peace there were. The theory was, that each monarch would feel his precious position threatened by other monarchs, and therefore would prepare himself to resist ¾ so that he would encourage the people, his "subjects," to be strong and well-armed. Perhaps, when kings were merely the ones with the longest lances or sharpest swords, kings behaved like that. But, after some generations of experience, even the most stupid king saw the light. If the king merely pretended that there was a danger of war, he could spend money freely on himself and his assistants, without actually taking the risk of losing life or position in real war. Half a millenium ago, kings realized that it was wise ¾ whether or not it was right ¾ to abide by international law.

What does international law say? Everyone knows at least part of international law: it says that one nation can not go to war against another without first sending an ultimatum, setting forth a casus belli [a cause for war], stating its terms for peace, and giving a time for the other party to reply. If you have to give notice before you attack the other party, war becomes difficult and dangerous indeed . . . . So that nations were not protected from war by the efforts of their kings; they were protected from war by law.

Thus the entire theory of government-as-an-equal ¾ the "social contract" between monarch and "subjects" ¾ was founded on the sheer black ignorance characteristic of the Old World, of people without the law.

Can this be true? Did kings ever abide by law? Have not past centuries, if not the whole of history, been full of wars? They have been so indeed. But ask yourself why any king should ever have obeyed the law, when the law gave such a great advantage to his intended victim? It cannot have been, so that historians should call him a Good King; wars are fought to determine who shall write (or, indeed, read) the histories. The only plausible answer is, because the many other nations demanded it, because they would oppose him if they saw him break the law. If a king broke the law and then won the war, it was because other kings failed to take up arms when they had good reason ¾ because kings were pacific, instead of being war-like. Self-interest told the king that it was less dangerous to turn his sword against the defenseless "subjects" than against other kings.

Similarly, governments today make efforts to appear friendly and trustworthy toward other governments (e. g. "foreign aid"); they are savage and destructive only to impress their own tax-payers.

Today, there is a far-from-cottage industry of writing books to show that the "policies" of government, particularly the U. S. government, in the field of banking, or of crime, or of transportation, or of medicine, or of agriculture, ad infinitum , have failed. There are those who suppose that this is because Washington is out-foxed by the clever devils in Bonn or Tokyo or Moscow or even London ¾ that vividly imaginative writer Robert A. Heinlein is an example ¾ or that the people in Washington are serving some perverse private end that eludes the imagination. It is intended to show that, on the contrary, the practices of government are not policies, but are known all along to be wrong. As was said of the Kennedy administration, "It’s not a calculated risk, it’s a calculated mistake."

An astonishingly comprehensive catalog of governmental wrongdoing can be found in James Bovard’s Lost Rights [St. Martin’s Press, New York: 1994.]

We have reviewed the Constitution and established what Washington is charged to do, and how it is to do it. Let us ask how what the States commanded compares with what we are seeing. (We may conveniently use the same topical headings as before.)

The Congress does indeed maintain an Army and a Navy ¾ and, indeed, an Air Force, a Marine Corps, a Coast Guard, a Border Patrol, a Customs Service, and who-knows-what other forces. (In 1998, the Immigration and Naturalization Service mustered 12,500 gendarmes!) How strange it is that the people of other nations regard these United States as their enemies, and must be kept from visiting or trading with them . . . . The revolutionaries of 1776 were stupid indeed to imagine that it was foreign governments who threatened them, when in fact it was individuals.

There is, however, one curious feature of this impressive establishment. Congress knows, better than do the professional soldiers and sailors, how many, and what kinds of, guns and tanks and ships they should have, and where they should be based.

Curiouser still is this when we reflect that war material requires to be better than the opponent’s material, i. e. only the best in the world (tomorrow’s world) is good enough ¾ one must always be buying something beyond the state of the art, an unknown quantity. If every separate purchase must be approved by Congress (a body anxious to avoid the risk of ever buying a conspicuous failure) the procurement of new weapon systems becomes ever slower and slower, and therefore (because a bigger jump in performance is demanded,) ever riskier and riskier. I am not the first to point out that, on the present trend, a time will soon come when aircraft, as well as ships, will be built in quantities of only one.

And, because very large sums must be spent at the proposal stage to reduce (foreseen) uncertainties, and because contractors are being compelled to share in the possible losses, fewer and fewer corporations are able to survive in the defense market. So that there is less competition, and ¾ as a logical result ¾ less likelihood of the contractor being successful.

The popular belief is that, because defense contractors charge very high sums for quite small items, such as ashtrays, they must have high profits. This is not sound reasoning: a very large and complex organization, one capable of functioning as a prime contractor for an innovative system, necessarily has high overhead costs and therefore cannot do small jobs efficiently. Further, the overhead of defense contractors is inflated because of the requirement that all expenditures of public money be accountable; there is a disproportionate number of bean-counters.

Was it because centralized purchasing saves dollars that the States delegated their defense to the Congress? Would any States secede, or even call for a convention, if they learned that some new weapon was not able to perform as promised? In fact, the reason Congress is so frugal with defense funding is not that it is conscientious in handling the States’ money, but that it resents doing what it has been ordered to do.

However, even although the Congress has provided all these many armed services, the citizens do not find themselves and their property safe everywhere in the world. The Congress, strange to relate, has omitted to lay down, in terms that the president ¾ and his opposite numbers in other nations ¾ cannot fail to comprehend, precisely in what circumstances those forces shall act. Instead of every nation knowing what the U. S. forces will do in any hypothetical case, other nations seek to make special arrangements with the U. S. to do such-and-such in the event of so-and-so. The world comes to be divided into "friendly" and "unfriendly" nations, none of which feel confident of what the U. S. may do beyond the next election.

The States have the right to be defended, not only from foreign powers, but also from domestic violence.

Apparently, no State has ever claimed this right. (Reportedly, the District of Columbia asserted it in 1993, to no avail.)

This circumstance has not prevented Republican presidents ¾ and one Democrat, Grover Cleveland ¾ from sending the U. S. army into a State.

It will be perceived that the domain of power has now been extended drastically by re-applying the term "domestic" to mean private instead of public.

The guarantee of a republican form of government means that, if there is a State police force or any other body that is not located in the capital and acting for all of the counties equally, the counties can call upon the U. S. for redress.

Apparently, no county has ever claimed this right.

The fixed salary of the president is intended to render him independent of the Congress (the king had been dependent on parliament from one year to the next.)

In 1998, there are heard suggestions that the Congress is competent to censure the president. This provision demonstrates that, to the contrary, the executive branch is to be independent of the legislative.

I, 2 [1] The president shall be commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States;

This is a safeguard against any coup d’etat ; there is to be no Secretary of Defense or other officer in a position to give orders to both army and navy.

I, 3 He shall, from time to time, give to the Congress information of the state of the union, and recommend to their consideration, such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both houses, or either of them, and in case of disagreement between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper;

Giving the president the power to convene the Senate, or the Congress, deprives him of any excuse for acting without their authority.

IV, 1 Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.

These provisions are plainly a convenience to litigants.

Granted that the States hoped for the common defense, domestic tranquillity, a stable measure of value, and such benefits ¾ what did they do to safeguard themselves against a power-loving Congress?

I, 1 [1] ALL legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States

I, 2 [4] When vacancies happen in the representation from any State, the executive thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies.

I, 2 [5] The House of Representatives shall choose their speaker and other officers;

I, 3 [2] . . if vacancies happen by resignation, or otherwise, during the recess of the legislature of any State, the executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the legislature, which shall then fill such vacancies.

I, 3 [4] The vice president of the United States shall be president of the Senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally divided. The Senate shall choose their other officers . . .

State officers are to have the first word on all matters (this is reaffirmed later.)

II, 4 The president, vice president, and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.

I, 2 [5] The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole power of impeachment.

I, 3 [6] The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the president of the United States is tried, the chief justice shall preside: and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the members present.

I, 3 [7] Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the United States; but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment, according to law.

Impeachment is a democratic process; the many representatives define the charges, the few senators accept or reject them.

I, 5 [1] Each house shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members, and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner, and under such penalties as each house may provide.

I, 5 [2] Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the consent of two-thirds, expel a member.

Far from the system being majority domination, a mere minority can compel the remainder to attend. Observe that to "punish" must mean something less than expulsion. (The Congress, like a church or other body, can do no more against an individual member than expel him.)

I, 6 [2] No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no person holding any office under the United States, shall be a member of either house during his continuance in office.

The first part of this clause frustrates ambition. The second forbids bureaucracy ¾ State officers and U. S. officers are to remain distinct.

I, 7 [1] All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments, as on other bills.

I, 7 [2] Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate shall, before it become a law, be presented to the president of the United States; if he approve, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to that house in which it originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration, two thirds of that house agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that house, it shall become a law . . .

An U. S. officer is not the equal of the House or the Senate; a bill can become law over the objections of the president.

I, 8 [16] [The Congress shall have power] To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district . . . as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings.

[The Congress shall have power] To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

Even if a law is necessary and proper, it can be enacted only by State officers, no matter that it concerns only one department or even one officer of the U. S:

I, 9 [7] No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law; . . .

This is the time-honored method of maintaining the power of the legislative over the executive, to allow the latter no money of its own.

II, i [3] The electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each; which list they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the president of the Senate. The president of the Senate shall . . . open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes shall be the president, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the House of Repesentatives shall immediately choose by ballot one of them for president; and if no person have a majority, then from the next five highest on the list, the House shall, in like manner, choose the president. But in choosing the president, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. In every case, after the choice of the president, the person having the greatest number of votes of the electors shall be the vice president. But if there should remain two or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from them by ballot the vice president. [Emphases added.]

The method of choosing the president is democratic. First the many electors meet (in their own States) and ballot; then the fewer States meet (in the House) and choose between the electors’ favorites.

Notice the words "sealed" and "open:" the electors do not merely seal the list, they send it sealed. If the candidates for the presidency knew how many votes the electors had cast for each of them, those who believed they had done well might canvass the Representatives, "Vote for me and I will do . . . for Alabama." If no-one knows how the electors voted until the president of the Senate opens the lists, this cannot happen, because the House chooses a president "immediately."

II, 1 [1] The president . . . may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices,

Just as State officers are superior to U.S. officers, so an elected officer is superior to unelected ones; the unelected ones merely advise the president when required.

II, 2 [1] The president . . . shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.

Today [1998] impeachment is regarded as an extraordinary measure, in that the Congress is removing an officer chosen by the States. But, normatively, the president would have been chosen by the House, and the vice president and other officers by the Senate.

II, 2 [2] [The president] shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the supreme court, and all other officers of the United States . . . . But the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper in the president alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.

Alexander Hamilton, notoriously an aristocrat, had proposed that the president be allowed, in the lesser matter of making appointments, the initiative, "subject to the approbation or rejection of the Senate," but this departure from democracy was rejected; if the officers of the States do not speak first, they speak not at all.