HERETOFORE, we have discussed whether the powers delegated to the U. S. have been "faithfully exercised" (to coin a phrase.) But what we see with regularity is the existence of utterly unauthorized, lawless governments. The contrast between the de jure (authorized) and the de facto (usurper) governments is nowhere more drastic than in Washington, D. C.

No-one, we may suppose, would mind the members of each succeeding Congress hiring help to meet the citizens, accept their gold and silver and copper, assay it, strike it into coins of uniform quality, and return it to them: indeed, if the mines were in Nevada and California, the citizens would surely be pleased to have their metal minted in Carson City and San Francisco.

Does anyone alive today suppose that the agencies of Congress do anything that Congress has been authorized to do?

We see that Congress has created the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and divers other agencies. We may ask, do these agencies proceed a priori, by taking counsel together? If so, why do the elected delegates of the States themselves not act, as they are paid to do? (Congress has power to frame "all laws which shall be necessary and proper . . . .") Unless these agencies act for all States equally, the States have been wronged ("No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce . . . .";) why else is the representation in the Senate equal, in the House apportioned? And unless these agencies act for all parts of the people equally ¾ shippers and carriers, growers and eaters ¾ then some part of the people has been deprived of a republican form of government.

Or, if not a priori, do the agencies act a posteriori, by trial and error? If the latter, why should not the people themselves act?

The plausible answer to the latter question is the one set out above, namely that there exist natural monopolies, such that competition can only be "cut-throat." However, if the Greyhound Corporation thinks that the traffic between Reno, Nevada and Wendover, Nevada, could conveniently fill up its San-Francisco-to-Chicago bus, and the Fast Camels Co. believes it could make a profit by running a more frequent service with smaller vehicles, there is an unobjectionable solution; to let the route to the high bidder. There is no reason why the people of Alabama and Alaska should be allowed to share in the proceeds of the auction: if it is more efficient for there to be inter-state carriers, then intra-state carriers will combine together to have a better chance in the auctions, and if it is more efficient for there to be one carrier from coast to coast, then inter-state carriers will merge for fear of Red Ink. And even less would it be justifiable for Alabama and Alaska to participate if the public, instead of collecting from the carrier for the service of protecting it from competition, were giving it a subsidy.

But, as is common knowledge, these agencies have found something for themselves to do: they are acting as a particularly vicious monopoly, deciding what shall and what shall not be offered in the market. Bearing in mind that the radio or television consumer receives the goods at no charge (courtesy of one or another sponsor), it is far from apparent why any majority, however large, should be competent to complain that the broadcasts are not to their taste. Where the good is not broadcast but sold, as by a carrier, a conflict of interest is created by the agency: normally, both those who want to pay less and accept less, and also those who want to get more and pay more, find agreeable traders in the market, but monopolist agencies deny satisfaction to the one element or the other.

Today we see everywhere regulation for the sake of regulation, or rather regulation for the sake of waste. The Securities Exchange Commission dictates how brokers and dealers shall serve their clients, how mutual funds shall be administered, ostensibly to protect investors against "front-running" and "churning" and "cross-selling" and otherwise failing to achieve "best execution" which, undeniably, nibbles away at the clients' profits. But there are hundreds of brokers and dealers and mutual funds ¾ and there are profit-making agencies in the business of rating them. Regulation by restraint is unnecessary, because the customers will find their own way to efficient managers, and it is also extravagant: the S. E. C. is funded by a fee that is paid equally by every firm concerned, efficient or otherwise, and it requires the firms to support compliance officers who merely see that the rules are followed (and keep records of every transaction for, literally, years.)

The president, let us recall, has the powers to pardon convicts, and to require the opinions, in writing, of the heads of departments. And to receive ambassadors, and to make recommendations to, and even convene, the Congress . . . . Nothing, really, that a good man could not do; the president is commander in chief of the army and the navy, not the commander of either one.

Rule of thumb, if anything is called "National," it is federal, e.g. the units of the National Guard belong to Alabama or to Alaska . . . or to Wyoming: and if anything is called "Federal," it is national, e.g. the Federal Reserve Bank. (There are, I admit, exceptions to the rule, viz. the National Bureau of Standards, the National Aeronautics and Space Agency.) The Federal Bureau of Investigation is essentially anti-federal; it acts, not with the authority of every State, but that of none.

It may very well be that, if ordinary persons are free to cross State lines, then investigators also would like to be free to cross State lines. And it may very well be that investigators would like to be able to gain access to the records of all the States. Then the investigators can go to their States and advocate that the States contract with a nation-wide investigation corporation and a nation-wide records bureau, which would have the rights of ordinary citizens to act, and travel, in any State.

This is assuredly plausible, because many nations do subscribe to the multi-national "Interpol" information exchange. But there is, plainly, no reason why all nations should take part: it is just the nations that prohibit narcotics (or alcohol, etc.) that harbor crime.

As we have already observed, there is plausible authority for a department to prosecute the counterfeiting of U. S. securities and current coin, the Secret Service. But the F. B. I. concentrates on investigating what are not crimes-against-citizens-in-every-State, but only public offenses, the so-called "organized crime" that does what ordinary profit-making, tax-paying businesses would do if not oppressed by legislation (i.e. provide drugs and liquor and gambling and effective refrigerants and sexual satisfaction.)

The national departments are, as a rule to which I know of no exception, non-republican; the personnel serve through election after election. Does this matter? Read any book studying the details of a government failure, and you will find the same story: the decisions were wrong because they were made aristocratically. Why do the many not object when the few act without their advice? Because the many expect favors from the few. Instead of offices being awarded by the many citizens, they are given by the few more-senior officers; promotion depends, not on what one knows (still less does,) but on whom one knows. In a profit-making enterprise, everyone understands that if the decisions are wrong, the customers will go elsewhere. . . the few do not dare to disregard the many.

A classical example is the launch of the Space Shuttle "Challenger" by the National Aeronautics and Space Agency; this was not an engineering failure (although the joint between sections could have been redesigned not to be grossly stiffer than the section centers, so that the sections would not have become barrel-shaped under pressure,) it was a sociological failure. The engineers who supplied the boosters knew quite well that their joint seals wouldn’t hold pressure after a long cold soak. But N. A. S. A. thinks of itself as the equal of a citizen, it does not ask for agreement before it acts. If the launching had been put out to the lowest bidder, Mr. Launcher would have asked Mr. Booster: "Can I count on your rockets? Yes, or No?"

An excellent account of the "Challenger" investigation can be found in Dr. Richard Feynman’s [posthumous] What Do YOU Care What Other People Think? (Norton, New York, N.Y.: 1988) Edward R. Tufte, Visual Explanations: Images and Quantities, Evidence and Narratives [Graphics Press, Cheshire, Ct.: 1997] contends that the proximate cause of the failure was that the engineers did not present their evidence so graphically that N. A. S. A. could not fail to understand it. This is absurd: the engineers needed to say only thirty-five words: "You did not specify firing in frosty weather. We did not design for frosty weather: we have not tested the motor in frosty weather. You fire in frosty weather at your own risk." If the customer is always right, even when the customer is a government, the customer is always responsible.

A striking example of the executive defying law and reason alike is the existence of a Public Health Service. How can there be "public health?" Are all persons equal in health? The answer is, that the U. S. perceives that there is a conflict between the private and public interests, and intends to take the latter side. The record shows that the Public Health Service, in the interest of "public" knowledge, for a period of decades denied health care to literally hundreds of men infected with syphilis while pretending to give them care ¾ and, when the patients were likely to be drafted into the armed services and truly given care, intervened to prevent this happening. The very essence of this "Tuskegee Study" was that the participants had not been informed even of the intent to perform such an experiment.

I do not pretend to understand medicine myself; I take this example from When Medicine Went Mad , edited by Arthur L. Caplan [Humana Press, Clifton, N.J.: 1992.] However, I do understand statistical method. The proper manner of conducting such an experiment is to go through the records of patients and find pairs of patients with similar diagnoses and prognoses whose doctors have made different choices of treatment, one using and the other rejecting the treatment in which the experimenter is interested, and then compare the subsequent case histories.

Of course, I am assured that "public health" has rid the globe of small-pox. I take leave to wonder what "public health" would do if there were discovered some isolated community in which a vaccine-resistant small-pox prevails ¾ I suspect that there would be a little doctor-assisted "suicide." In 1999, studies suggested that small-pox ranked with anthrax as the major threat in the arsenal of biological warfare.

It is one thing for the U. S. to blunder pathetically from one day to the next. It is quite another for it to visit death and desolation upon one generation after another.

But, because the Constitution requires Congress ¾ not the president ¾ to coin money, it has come to be supposed that Congress can delegate its powers to the executive. One that is persistently exercised by the executive is regulation.

Congress is authorized to "regulate" the value of both its own and foreign coin; one can do nothing to a foreign coin but assay it, so we may deduce that to "regulate" is not a matter that requires any judgment, but only faithful obedience. This, indeed, an executive is competent to do. But what the executive is doing today is quite other than this.

Examples that are particularly destructive and reasonably easy to follow are afforded by the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. Now, the Congress itself is authorized to create standards of weight and of measures. And it is known what a "standard" is: it allows you to say that one thing is less than, or equal to, or more than, some other thing. A standard is a tool, which may well be useful; it is not a weapon, with which to kill and destroy.

One can perfectly well imagine safety standards. One regularly hears the complaint against U. S. cars that "at 40 you steer it, at 80 you aim it." This is because the designer puts the passengers in the middle of the wheelbase, where the ride is best; as a result, the heavy engine and transmission are in the front of the car, and therefore the car is stable, it tends to keep going straight. When the speed of the car goes up, the tire forces needed to maneuver become larger, and bigger steering inputs are required. This characteristic of front-end-heavy vehicles is called "understeer;" it does not matter much if you only trundle along expressways, but it makes the vehicle unhappily slow on corners.

The measure of this effect is the "characteristic speed." If, at a crawl, a given steeri