THESE United States have already been reformed once, when the States repudiated the social contract between themselves and Congress and created a Congress that they could abolish at will. But it is plain that, today, the States are failing us drastically; we pay them to defend us, and then are left to defend ourselves. There are two different questions facing us: first, what should the States do? And second, how do we get them to do these things?

We have seen that, while the Constitution was indeed "more perfect" than the Articles of Confederation, it was "not quite" perfect, and the imperfections (the vestiges of the old "social contract" system) have been exploited to overthrow the original institutions and erect an openly lawless structure. We should start by recognizing what needs to be done to restore democracy: if we have a reasonable agenda, it is at least possible that some of the States will be attracted to the program. After all, many of the powers that the U. S. is exercising now (defining a legal tender, restricting immigration and importation, punishing crimes) have been usurped from the States.

We have seen that the Constitution was created with painstaking care to uphold the States’ rights. It may well be asked, what further amendment could possibly augment the States’ rights? Always the Constitution has provided that the States have a right to exist, a right to call a convention and abolish the legislative, executive, or judicial branches, a right to equal or apportioned representation in the two houses of Congress, a right to equal taxation per capita , a right to require the U. S. to defend them from domestic violence, a right to choose (among gold and silver coins) a legal tender, a guarantee of a republican form of government . . . . And amendments already effected have established that the States have any inherent powers of governments, as opposed to the mere delegated powers of the Congress.

However, there was one respect in which the Constitution was not democratic, viz. it preserved the power of the Congress to initiate amendments. And this power has been exploited by the Congress to seize the great plain between what is necessary and proper, on the one hand, and what has been prohibited, on the other.

We have seen that the Constitution is everywhere democratic ¾ except in the one instance, that the Congress is still allowed to submit amendments on its own initiative. This initiative has been used by Congress to introduce to the Constitution a mass of unrelated prohibitions that are quite unrelated to its grants of power. Congress today is almost invariably exercising powers never granted, such as that to choose a legal money.

Obviously, it is no longer true that it is difficult or slow or expensive for the States to meet in convention; even delegates from Alaska or Hawaii can travel to a convention in a day or so. The time has come to eradicate this last vestige of aristocracy, to put a stop to the Congress submitting amendments.

As long ago as 1861, the Constitution of the Confederate States of America, while following closely that of the United States, instituted democracy throughout by allowing amendment in only one manner, by the States in convention. And we should also do away with the power of Congress to decide whether an amendment is to be ratified by the legislatures or by conventions; this is a question for each State to settle for itself.

This would still leave us with the problem of undoing all the wrongs that have been done. The answer is, to repeal all the amendments that were wrongfully ratified.

The ratifiers failed utterly to foresee some of the modes of failure that have occurred in these United States.

One of the most surprising is that some States, such as Nevada, have accepted the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States as precedents ¾ the courts of Nevada, instead of finding the law in forty-nine sovereign States, look for it in one subordinate government!

Plainly, if the State of Nevada is accepting U. S. decisions, its judges are failing to test those decisions. Equally plainly, if Nevada does not aspire to be self-governing, the remaining States cannot help it (and, even more plainly, the U. S. would not protest!)

But there is indeed a remedy. It is, to abolish the judicial power of the United States, and allow the U. S. to sue and be sued only in the courts of the States. This would stop the U. S. courts consistently exceeding their jurisdiction; if there are no U. S. courts, then the courts cannot find law anywhere but in the State precedents. We have already remarked that, when a citizen is wronged by the U. S., his remedy is in the courts of the State where the U. S. acted (see Chapter Nine.)

A case between a State and a citizen of another State would be tried in the courts of a third State. In these days, it is not a great inconvenience to attend a court one or two thousand miles from Washington, D. C. There would of course be the question, how would the third, neutral State be chosen? Questions like this are not new or difficult. One method of answering such questions is illustrated in the Articles of Confederation, in the method of choosing the judges or commissioners of the Congress:

Congress shall name three persons out of each of the United States, and from the list of such persons each party shall alternately strike out one, the petitioners beginning, until the number shall have been reduced to thirteen; and from that number not less than seven . . . shall, in the presence of the Congress be drawn out by lot . . . .

Because the U. S. courts have both original and appellate jurisdiction, the amendment would need to be slightly complicated; it might be as follows.

But why abolish only one branch of the U. S? In 1787, there was no alternative to the republican form of government; the States could not keep in touch with world affairs, they had no alternative but to send representatives to the capital to act on their behalf. Now, with instantaneous communication, this is no longer true; the States can act directly, instead of through fallible and faithless agents.

The House of Representatives does have an irreplaceable function; it watches over the executive and judicial branches, and brings in articles of impeachment. We most emphatically need the president (and the judges, until they are abolished) to go in fear of impeachment. Therefore, the House cannot be abolished.

The Senate, however, is merely the States in conclave ¾ except that the senators represent their States in the most dilatory, feckless, irresponsible manner conceivable. (As we have remarked before, the Senate even allows the president to initiate treaties and appointments without its advice.) There is not the slightest reason to retain a Senate in the capital . Measures passed by the House could be submitted to the several State capitals for approval; the time taken for transmission would be negligible compared to the time needed for debate.

The present number of Senators, two, is, conveniently, the number of houses in most of the State legislatures. The obvious step is to have two members of each State legislature stationed in the State capital, in communication with the president of the Senate (the vice president of the U. S.) in Washington, D. C. Whenever the House of Representatives passed a bill, it would be transmitted by the president of the Senate to all the senators, who would then send back their Ayes and Nays.

And, whenever there was an appointment to be advised, or an issue with a foreign power to be resolved, the senators of one State would propose a name, or a measure, to the president of the Senate, and he would relay the proposal to the other senators and see whether the other States concurred; when and if they did, then the president (of the U. S.) would appoint or act according to their advice.

This is, to my observation, by no means Star Wars fantasy; already the members of Congress follow the debates by television from their offices, instead of actually sitting in the chamber. Nor is it likely that there would be grave delay in arriving at a consensus ¾

It would still be necessary for the senators to meet together on some occasions, e. g. to try impeachments, but normally the Senators would be in their own capitals, and under the immediate supervision of the legislatures when they were in session. There would no longer be a risk of utterly ill-conceived measures receiving assent, because in the States there is no shortage of educated men ¾ lawyers and scientists and engineers and ministers of God ¾ who would monitor the Senators.

This would put a stop to two of the vicious abus order of merit, and shown up the inferiority of the front-wheel-drive configuration.

Examples could be added easily. Have you ever run out of fuel in a vehicle with an "fluid" transmission? The first warning you get is, that the power steering disappears ¾ which is not at all funny. But the "Safety Standards" do not discriminate between vehicles which do, and those which do not, lock up the torque converter at cruise. Have you ever watched a modern car burn? When the fire reaches the back, where the plastic fuel filler cap is, there is a woof!! and a great jet of burning gasoline shoots out for several feet, setting alight anything near the burning car; once upon a time, cars had steel filler caps that did not come off when heated, but the "Safety" Standards do not discriminate old, safe cars from new, dangerous ones.

Not only do the Standards fail to tell better from worse, they do not even show that all are the same. F. M. V. S. S. 127 covers emergency exits from passenger vehicles. One year, the company for which I was working won the contract to do the 127 testing; I ran around with an ellipsoid and two parallelepipeds, testing emergency exits. Of the school buses I tested, the smallest carried twelve children and the largest eighty-four: the 12-seater failed and the 84-seater passed. However, the exits on the former were larger than those on the latter.

One might perhaps think that a large bus needed as large an exit as a small bus. But no; there are not one, but two, Standards, for buses under and over 10,000 lb. gross vehicle weight rating respectively. And the former required the emergency exit to be "unobstructed" ¾ hence I carried my parallelepipeds, to prove that a parallelepipoidal child could get through the exit. But the word "unobstructed" did not appear in the latter; when you opened the exit door of the 84-seater, you found that a good two-thirds of it was blocked by a seat. (However, a seat that folded up, like a theater seat, was an option ¾ for those operators who knew that the Standard was just a savage, and expensive, jest.)

What, you may well ask, about my ellipsoid? The ellipsoid was a solid generated by rotating an ellipse 16 in. by 20 in. about its minor axis; it was the opposite shape to a football. The Standard required that the ellipsoid pass through the emergency exit with "the major axis horizontal." However, as any school-child can see, in every conceivable attitude one of the infinitely many major axes is horizontal; the words mean nothing. So I gave the words some meaning, viz. that the major axes (all of them) should be horizontal. And I found that on one big, beautiful new interstate bus the ellipsoid could not exit in that attitude, because the emergency exit was only 19-3/4 inches wide, instead of 20 inches (I imagine that the same exits were installed on some other buses, too; they test only a dozen buses a year.) But Washington disagreed; they chose to read the words to mean nothing, to allow the ellipsoid to be threaded through with the minor axis at an angle to the vertical; all the other bus manufacturers, who had installed exits 20 inches wide, had wasted their money ¾ or, rather, the operators’ and the riders’ money. (If there were to be any defense for the Standard at all, it should have read, "with one major axis along the length of the vehicle," so that if the bus had fallen over sideways you could wriggle out with your shoulders and hips horizontal.)

Operators like to be able to change the wheels when they have a puncture or a separation of a tire; thus there is the design problem of making the wheels easily removable by an operator, but nevertheless safe against coming loose. Now, there is a perfectly good solution to this problem, formerly seen with regularity on racing and sports cars, the "knock-off" hub. This design has one big nut for each wheel, with right-hand threads on the left side of the car and left-hand threads on the right side; any movement of the wheel on the hub causes the nut to tighten until movement stops. These nuts had projecting ears, so they could be loosened with a lead or copper mallet (or, if the devil were driving, any heavy, hard object at all); you did not need a lug wrench of the right size. F. M. V. S. S. 211 prevented the use of these safe, convenient nuts: after a mere quarter of a century, in 1993, it was amended to allow them if the nut were within the wheel rim (because this is precisely the place where the wheel bearings should be, the concession is worth little or nothing.) As a result, we see four or more nuts on every wheel, requiring exactly the right size wrench to turn them, and the nuts are kept from loosening as the vehicle rolls only by jamming the conical face tightly into the wheel: because service shops do not want to be liable for a wheel coming loose, they tighten the nuts with an impact wrench, and the operators frequently find they cannot loosen the nuts at the roadside when they have tire trouble.

Even these are only minor instances of degrading the vehicles. One "Standard" calls for safety harnesses to be provided for every passenger ¾ not just in limousines, but also in sedans and sports cars ¾ and even for the driver. Outside Washington, D. C., there cannot be a single adult person who believes it is worth spending money to increase highway safety (one would have to travel one hundred Apollo missions to have an "average" chance of dying on a highway in the States ¾ further than in Britain, Canada, or any other country) and if there were, such an one would not spend the money on the vehicle, which has only a limited life (if the hundreds of dollars wasted by Washington had been charged by the State registering the vehicle for the first time, it could have been invested to render the highways less crowded, less difficult to negotiate, more productive.) The Standard does not prevent the vehicles being provided with harnesses that are non-adjustably uncomfortable, so that the driver ¾ who needs to be comfortable and not distracted from the ever-changing situation ¾ would be ill advised to use them at all.

Obviously, the effect of a blatant requirement such as this is that those buyers who are inclined to consume capital now in the hope of seeing a return later (the gamblers) are advantaged at the expense of those who are only just able to find the capital, or are forced to borrow (the poor.)

However, whether the gamblers will indeed see a return is doubtful in the extreme. Nowadays, a fairly large fraction of vehicles (almost all General Motors passenger vehicles, for instance) is equipped with anti-lock braking systems, which render it easier for the driver to keep control of the vehicle when braking to the fullest extent the highway will support. But the insurance companies find that this expensive elaboration makes no difference to the costs they incur in repairing the vehicles that they insure. (It must indeed be expensive ¾ it would be really worthwhile on motorcycles, where locking the front wheel results in the machine falling over, but very few makers even offer it as an option.) The explanation is that ¾ as every mechanical engineer knows ¾ the public transportation system is limited, not by the performance of the vehicles, but by that of the highways.

Why, you may well ask, did General Motors make this blunder? They knew perfectly well how to make a vehicle that did not need anti-lock braking, nor even power braking ¾ the Chevrolet Corvair? The answer is, because the braking Safety[sic] Standard demands that the brakes not lock the wheels.

The appropriate place to spend money is on the long-lived civil engineering, on increasing the design speed of the highway by lengthening the sight-lines, banking the corners higher, raising the friction of the surface.

And, obviously, the States could achieve immense improvements in safety without spending money at all ¾ they could put an end to maximum speed limits, to

In New York, the highways are consistently narrow with shockingly tight on- and off-ramps (presumably land was already expensive before the era of the automobile), these features being regularly aggravated by segregation of traffic in opposite directions. The State has sheltered itself from liability for its recklessness by imposing capricious maximum speed limits ¾ the same for cars, motorcycles, trucks ¾ so severe that a significant proportion of the traffic exceeds them. The New York Times, which presumably does not exaggerate the backwardness of its readers, reports [apparently in all seriousness] that local drivers do not realise that they are expected to decide how fast the vehicle they are driving can negotiate the corner they are approaching; the State has succeeded in dumbing down its citizens to subjects.

The studied insubordination of the U. S. government is illustrated eminently by the instance of the [so-called] air-bags found in numerous vehicles. The operators, hardly surprisingly, disapprove of these safety[sic] features killing and injuring lightweight passengers. But the U. S. government expects the operators to consult it before eliminating this "feature!" To the injury of selling the operators an expensive, temperamental gadget, the creature adds the insult of offering a title of nobility.

Safety is not achieved by spending money blindly. In October, 1999, the Wall Street Journal devoted a whole page and a photograph [a photograph in the staid Journal!] to an incident in which a police van had run into a building, killing two persons. The "explanation" was that the flashing police lights had been connected into the brake light circuit, and so when the lights were on the shift lock did not work.

What, you may well ask, is a shift lock? The shift lock is a "safety feature:" it prevents you moving the shift lever out of Park unless the service brake is applied. In fifty-five years, I have twice found that vehicles I have started had no service brakes; the shift lock would have saved me from these surprises. Except that this incident proves that the shift lock is not worked by hydraulic pressure, it is worked by the brake light circuit! And anyway we still do not have an explanation; why should someone have speeded up the engine before he had moved the shifter out of Park, through Reverse, through Neutral, and into Drive? Why indeed? Because he had supposed that the shift lock was working, and therefore had intended to put his foot on the brake pedal. The provision of shift locks was the cause of the "accident."

In the car rental business, you spend half your time saying. "Sir, if you will press on the brake pedal before you squeeze the button on the shift lever . . . ." (The other half is spent saying "Madam, have you tried to start it both in Park and in Neutral?")

The executive is expected, by the Congress, to observe how much its regulations cost. These cost studies are another thing of which I have first-hand knowledge. In the beginning, vehicles (a dozen or so) were compared at three dates, firstly before the Standard, secondly immediately the Standard took effect, and thirdly years later; if one assumed that the vehicles were not, in the normal course of events, continually becoming cheaper (as indeed they were), that the three data points were joined by straight lines, and that the cost did not change after the first few years, then one could estimate the cost of implementing the Standard. However, after a little while only two dates were used, before and immediately after the Standard; and then we began "measuring" the cost even before the first vehicle had been manufactured. The cost estimates ¾ which were usually expressed in small fractions of a dollar ¾ were nothing but guesses.

Not only the safety, but every other quality, of the vehicle are degraded by the "Safety Standards." The design and manufacture of any item whatsoever is venturesome; time and capital must be invested, without knowing whether or not the customer will choose to reward the investor. But the existence of "Standards" changes the nature of the risk qualitatively. Ordinarily, one expects a design to be either highly profitable or not-so-highly profitable or not-quite-profitable. But the "Standards" introduce a new mode of failure; if the vehicle does not meet one or some of the Standards, it has little chance of being sold in the States, it may well be an unqualified loss. (This is, be it noted, quite apart from the fact that simply performing all the tests costs a significant amount of money, and imposes a delay at a late stage when a large investment has already been made.)

Consequently, fewer and fewer new designs can be undertaken; you still see innumerable names in the advertisements, but it may prove that even vehicles that appear to pon 100-word-a-minute television programs

Section 3. No person shall be a senator or representative in Congress, or elector of president and vice president, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof . . . .

Here the Congress proposed that the States compromise their right to choose their own officers! Once again, no majority of the States is enough to adopt this.

Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned . . . .

The Congress is authorized to borrow money on the credit of the United States; thus this provision serves the interest of the Congress itself. But the provision is utterly unrealistic ¾ three fourths, or even twelve thirteenths, are not sufficient to agree any matter beyond question, nor does their agreeing today bind the people of tomorrow. A judicious State would be continually watching the debt of the United States and deciding how much of it that State was prepared to underwrite.

Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

Here again the amendment is in the interest of Congress; the word "appropriate" stops short of determining what legislation is and what is not authorized. However, the amendment concedes power only to the Congress; it does not purport to grant any power to the judicial branch to hear cases arising under the amendment. (Cases brought by citizens against States were, we have seen, removed from the jurisdiction of the U. S. courts by the Eleventh Amendment.)

Amendment XV.

Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Here we see again the fraudulent amendment, purporting to limit the Congress but in fact inferring power ¾ there exist no United States elections in which "citizens" vote, only those in which the State electors ballot and the House chooses a president or the Senate a vice-president. One must wonder how the Congress could "deem it necessary" to modify the Fourteenth Amendment system whereby representation was apportioned to the franchise . . . and one must suspect that it was because a Republican Congress expected those who had formerly been denied the vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude to vote Republican.

Article XVI. The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.

This amendment, strange to relate, was properly adopted by a mere three fourths; it offers no slightest suggestion that an income tax can be unequal, that a majority is enough to tax a minority. An income tax is, in fact, in itself apportioned, because the number of incomes in a State is the same as the number of persons in the State; so long always as an income of $1 and $1,000,000 are taxed equally no-one is wronged (the words "from whatever source derived" prohibit Congress from granting any exemptions, either to rich or to poor.)

Nevertheless, this was a savagely destructive amendment; a tax on property compels the owner of the property to make good use of it, on pain of losing it to another, but a tax on incomes encourages the owners of assets ¾ particularly skill and ability, which yield nothing except by means of effort ¾ to leave them unused. It is easy to see why it was adopted; it transferred the burden of taxation from the rich to those who would have become rich tomorrow, the gifted. It is because the rich are eternally successful in opposing property taxes that the Congress today cannot balance the budget; an income tax is severely limited in the amount of revenue it can bring in, because any increase in the tax rate makes it less worth while for the citizen to risk what he has in order to make more.

Presumably, it is perfectly plain that if Black and Brown and Green and Grey each put in $10,000 to set up a business, there is no reason why they should pay more taxes than White, who can raise $40,000 all by himself ¾ but today Congress is collecting tax twice over in the case of corporations. The debates in Congress afford reason to believe that Congress indeed had this abuse in mind when it submitted the amendment

Article XVII. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two senators from each State, elected by the people thereof for six years . . . .

The Seventeenth Amendment has much in common with the Sixteenth ¾ it was properly adopted by three fourths of the States, and it is vicious. Its effect is that Senators are chosen by people who hardly know the candidates, so that the most important qualification for the office is to be able to raise great quantities of money or services with which to campaign (and, it is openly admitted, those who provide the money, or the services, are inclined to expect favors in return . . . .)

Article XVIII.

Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof, for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.

The reason for this amendment is, that the Articles of Confederation had reserved to the States the legislative power of "prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodities whatsoever"; the U. S. legislature, the Congress, has never been accorded any such power.Today, it is common to hear denials that there is such a thing as the "general welfare"; the prevailing belief is, that one can and does gain by making another worse off. This amendment is a good illustration of the meaning of the "general welfare": when persons or nations agree to join together in defense of one another, all of them save the expense of private or national security, no one is worse off ¾ but prohibiting the manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating liquors may make some persons better off, but only relative to others who become worse off. (There is a weak hint that Congress understood that it was attacking the rights of citizens; the words "for beverage purposes" conceded that some persons would want liquor for religious or medical purposes.)

Section 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

We have argued that "shall have power" means "shall" as distinct from "may". But it is pointless to say "shall" and follow with "appropriate", because the word "appropriate" leaves room for argument whether the command has or has not been obeyed. In any case, three fourths of the States are not enough to say what the remaining fourth "shall" do (nor even what Congress "shall" do, unless what is demanded is for the general welfare, the welfare of all these United States).

Section 3. This amendment shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of submission hereof to the States by the Congress.

This section has one redeeming virtue; it introduced the term "submit" as appropriate for the Congress in addressing its creators. But it also concedes that the amendment is not for the benefit of the States; if an amendment were in favor of the States, then a State that ratified today will remain in favor tomorrow. And if an amendment is not in favor of the States, today’s legislature cannot ratify on behalf of its successors. (No doubt, the Congress supposed that legislatures would ratify by majority vote.)

Article XIX. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.

Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

This amendment is yet another attempt to portray the U. S. as the equal of a State. Citizens of the United States have no right to vote that the U. S. could deny or abridge; in U. S. elections, only electors and senators and State delegations to the House vote. And in the States, voting is not a right but a privilege ¾ according to the Fourteenth Amendment, one has the rights of a citizen at birth, but one can claim to vote only at age twenty-one.

The "appropriate legislation" phrase is not only objectionable but unjustifiable ¾ the legislation that is appropriate is already specified in the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 2; viz. the representation of the affected State is to be reduced proportionately.

To say that a particular right shall not be denied or abridged "on account of sex" is either to say nothing ¾ because the nature of a right is, that it can be abridged only with the consent of the holder ¾ or else it is to say two other things: first, that the "right" may be denied or abridged on grounds other than sex, and second, that rights other than the one specified may be denied or abridged on account of sex. It is conspicuous that the courts have held that the amendment says something rather than nothing ¾ the "right" to vote is denied on grounds of age, the right to work is, or has been, restricted on grounds of sex (hence the proposed "Equal Rights Amendment.")

Article XX.

Section 1. The terms of the President and Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th. day of January, and the terms of senators and representatives at noon on the 3d. day of January . . . .

Section 2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d. day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a different day.

Section 3. If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of president, the president elect shall have died, the vice president elect shall become president . . . .

Section 4. The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a president . . . .

Section 5. Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th. day of October following the ratification of this article.

Section 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified . . . .

Here is another of the rare amendments properly ratified by three fourths; these changes are not adverse to the States (to say that Congress may "by law" provide for the case of . . . is to prevent the Congress from indulging its favorite trick of changing the rules in the middle of the game) and they affect all the States equally.

Article XXI.

Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed.

Section 2. The transportation or importation into any State, territory, or possession of the United States, for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.

Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of submission hereof to the States by the Congress.

I, 8 [10] [The Congress shall have power] To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations:

The States ¾ maritime and land-locked alike ¾ have the right to sail the seas on their lawful occasions. The burden of putting down piracy is shared by all.

I, 8 [16] The Congress shall have power] To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress:

The States have the right to appoint the officers of the militia, and to perform the training of the militia ¾ in order, obviously, to ensure that the militia is loyal to the State.

I, 8 [17] [The Congress shall have power] To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings:

The States have the right to sell, or refuse to sell, to the U. S. any land that may be "needful" for the common defense. "Forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards" are plainly defense facilities; there is no suggestion that Congress may own land for prisons and internment camps.

I, 9 [1] The migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year 1808, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importations, not exceeding 10 dollars for each person.

The States have the right to admit or exclude immigrants, whereas the Congress has only the power to prohibit immigration. It is difficult to see why Congress should be allowed even a negative; the difficulty was apparent at the time, and disguised by putting it twenty years away in the future.

I, 9 [5] No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State.

The reason why Congress is not allowed to lay any tax or duty on exports is, no doubt, that exports are expected to be peculiar to a few States, other States will engage mainly in domestic trade.

I, 9 [6] No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce to the ports of one State or those of another: nor shall vessels bound to, or from one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another.

Not only taxation and representation, but also regulation, are to be equal among the States. (Congress may regulate two things: commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes; and the value of its own and foreign coin ¾ the latter, one may suppose, affects all States equally.) The very meaning of the word regulate excludes the sense of "alter" or "abolish."

III, 2 [1] The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States, between a State and citizens of another State, between citizens of different States, between citizens of the same State claiming land under grants of different States, and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.

III, 2 [2] In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall be party, the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction.

The States have the right to sue, and be sued, in the Supreme Court of the U. S.

III, 2 [3] The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed.

The term "all crimes" must include counterfeiting the current coin, a crime† against the United States. Thus the States retain ¾ through their jurors ¾ a veto on any exercise of the power of the U. S. against persons.

IV, 2 [2] A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime.

The States have the power to try crimes, including treason (although the punishment of treason is prescribed by the Congress.)

IV, 2 [3] No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.

The States have a right to have their laws respected by other States; however, there is no suggestion that States have the right to exact service or labor from persons.

VI [2] This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

Observe that it is "the judges in every State" who find the law of the land.

I, 10 [2] No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress.

This appears to be a denial of the States’ rights ¾ as it is certainly a limitation of them ¾ but it affirms that only "such laws" (which do indeed affect foreign relations) are subject to the "revision and control" of the Congress.

This means that each county shall be represented in the State, and that any officer acting in a county (as distinct from the whole State) shall be chosen by the county. If the county can redress its grievances at the next election, it will not be inclined to resort to violence, and the United States cannot be called upon to act.

The citizens of each State have a right to a measure of value which is known and stable from time to time.

The words "Congress shall have power to coin money" mean "Congress shall coin money." It is highly desirable to give this mandate; if anyone can have his gold or silver struck into coins, then coins will be worth no more than the metal they contain, and their value will remain the same from the beginning of the year to the end (if everyone begins to hoard coins, and therefore all prices, including gold and silver, go down, then more coins will be minted to restore the original value of the coins.) Thus one can compare one’s opening balance with the closing balance, and find a profit or a loss. There can be no doubt that this mandate was intended by the Convention; the Virginia Plan proposed by Governor Randolph originally limited the States to "any thing but specie," the Convention plainly meant to use the best of species. (We can now see that they made a mistake ¾ platinum is better than either gold or silver, because it is hard enough to form a usable coin without being alloyed, so that Manx Nobles and Australian Koalas can be weighed all mixed together.) If, in contrast, Congress is allowed to create an artificial scarcity of coins then no-one can know how the value of the coin today compares with that of a year ago. (Congress may well be allowed to prohibit the copying of U. S. coins ¾ it is normal that the output of only a few mints is "good delivery" ¾ but there is no reason to allow Congress to prohibit the minting of coins equal in value to U. S. coins, e.g. casino chips.)

Today, some commentators regret that this power was given, on the grounds that the best-quality coins were always struck by private mints. However, they are in error. The cost of making the metal into a coin will necessarily be higher for small coins than large ones; a private mint must either charge more seigniorage for small coins, or else make the small ones of lower quality. One can have plentiful coins ("free coinage") of uniform quality ¾ so that gold fives and tens and twenties, or silver dollars and halves and quarters, can be weighed all together ¾ only if the mint does not have to make a profit.

I, 9 [3] No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.

I, 9 [8] No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States.

I, 10 [1] No State shall . . . pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility.

These provisions mean that each person shall enjoy "the protection of law": legislation shall be directed neither against anyone (no bills of attainder) nor in favor of anyone (no titles of nobility.) Congress is not prohibited from impairing the obligation of contracts, because Congress has no legislation (the power to "regulate" commerce is not the power to make law.)

III, 2 [3] The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed.

The citizens have a right to be tried only by a jury of their neighbors (except where they commit a crime among strangers.) And