From Theory to Practice

 

WE HAVE SEEN that the States could make many changes that would allow their citizens to enjoy liberty and tranquillity. However, States do not know right from wrong: this power was given to (or, Biblical scholars may say, taken by) mankind alone. Just as the U. S. can only be altered or abolished by the States, so the States and counties can only be corrected by citizens.

What, then, can the individual citizen do?

We have seen that ethics determines what persons who are equal shall do; they must all join to oppose wrongdoing. But we have seen also that the law flowing from this principle governs the overwhelming majority, the state ¾ we cannot claim that there is any agreed theory establishing what an individual is to do in all cases. The principle shows that the citizens cannot allow wrongdoing to go uncontested, but it does not show what each of the individual citizens is to do.

Thus, whereas I can defend against criticism the conclusions in the preceding chapters, the suggestions in this chapter are merely my considered opinions; other people may have better ones.

WHAT NOT TO DO

Recall how these United States fell into their present straits: they originally had a constitution concerted by twelve States acting in consensus ¾ but it has now been reduced to shreds by amendments submitted by two thirds and ratified by three fourths . . . .

The method by which those in power seize more power is, to divide the society, to set one part against another. To resist them, one should oppose any measure that any one, any few, would oppose.

And the States have still not understood this. Only recently, the Equal Rights Amendment was ratified by many of the States. It read:

Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.

Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.

 

This amendment would ¾ possibly ¾ make it easier for a man to complain of rape, or to inherit part of his wife’s estate. But it does not advance the general welfare, it does not tighten the chains binding the government.

To say, "Equality of rights shall not be denied . . . on account of sex" is to say that equality of rights can be denied on grounds other than sex ¾ which is flatly false, the only conceivable demonstration of a right is that all persons equally can claim it.

To say "by the United States or by any State" is to make the United States equal to a State: this is again flatly false, three fourths of the States are indeed enough to command the U. S., but not the last few States.

To say "shall have power . . . by appropriate legislation" is absurd: the words "shall have power" are a command, the word "appropriate" conveys discretion or judgment ¾ qualities of which agents and authorities are devoid.

And the amendment, as submitted, is grotesquely inadequate to address today’s issues. What has happened is that legislatures have overthrown the rights of the citizens and substituted privileges: for example, the right of a citizen to make a contract, and to be freed from it if the other party breaks it, has been narrowed down to the privilege to marry a specified number of persons of a specified class, and the privilege to divorce on grounds chosen by the legislature. The amendment says nothing about the privileges that abound today; one could argue that the States are already bound to give equal protection, but there has never been a suggestion that the U. S. is under any such obligation. Precisely as one would expect of an amendment submitted by the Congress, the Equal Rights Amendment concedes power to the Congress.

History shows that the Congress has succeeded in preventing the holding of a [first] Constitutional Convention by this technique of itself submitting amendments that some part of the States will entertain. No actual reform will be effected with the consent of the Congress.

Even worse than the Equal Rights Amendment is the Amendment 2 adopted in Colorado in 1992:

Neither the State of Colorado through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of, or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status, or claim of discrimination. This section of the constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.

The only conceivable meaning of this amendment is that other sexual orientations, conducts, practices, or relationships can be made the basis of minority status, quota preference, protected status . . . . The people of Colorado have, in their estimation, discovered a new method for determining law, which does not require that all parties be equal. And, apparently, their new method is so convincing that the majority of the people in the State can impose it on "political subdivisions" ¾ meaning, one must suppose, the counties which originally created the State.

Stephen Bransford, Gay Politics vs. Colorado: The Inside Story of Amendment 2 [Sardis Press, Cascade, Co: 1994] reports that the amendment was indeed intended to affect ordinances in some few cities, and to allow special privileges on grounds other than homo- or bi-sexuality.

If the amendment had merely read "Neither the State of Colorado through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy to entitle any person or class of persons to . . . discrimination", then every reasonable person would have been compelled to admit that it was unobjectionable: it would have reflected the fact that individuals and counties are threatened by the State. As it was enacted, it suggested that there was a conflict of interest between some citizens and others; less than 55% of the voters were in favor.

The majority is competent to act only if it is acting for all equally, or in favor of the minority; to create a division in the society is to make it easier for the lawless to hold on to power.

A plausible amendment is the provision found in the Constitution of Arizona:

No law shall be enacted granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens or corporations.

We do not want the Congress to imagine that it can charter corporations, so we cannot accept the words "other than municipal," but otherwise this would be a good "Equal Privileges Amendment." (Recalling how devious Congress has proved itself, it might well be preferable to add, after "granting", "or denying".)

WHAT ONE CAN DO

The first thing to do is simple and obvious; register to vote. The popular opinion is that voting is a waste of effort, because the system is set up so that the incumbents always win: however, the incumbents win only because they pander to the voters. Surveys show that, although only about 45% of the citizens vote in an election, about 85% of the officers ¾ police, prison guards, bailiffs ¾ vote. Citizens who do not vote are inviting the officers to seize power.

We have seen earlier that a great mass of people, too large to meet and discuss and debate, is not capable of arriving at answers to any but trivial questions. However, a small mass of people ¾ the people of a county, perhaps ¾ is capable of finding a good man to represent them (a candidate cannot deceive his neighbors as easily as he can deceive people who have never met nor dealt with him.) And, when you have registered, you not only vote in elections, you also become eligible to sit on juries.

Juries are different. They deal with important questions; and they have only a (relatively) few members, so that all of them can discuss the issues and arrive at a decision.

The Petit Jury

There are two kinds of juries. The one we see in the movies and on television, seated in the court-room, is the petit jury, of twelve or less. (There may be alternate jurors, who will take the place of any of the twelve who have to drop out, but otherwise will not take part in the decision.) As we all know, the petit jury can convict only unanimously: You, equally with every other member, have the power to keep your fellow man, or woman, or men, or women, safe from violence. (If, in any State, this is not true, then that State is backward indeed; unless the jury acts unanimously, we cannot hold each individual member responsible for what is done. But you can reform that State: once the jury is assembled, you say to your fellows, "If any one of you has a reasonable doubt, I will support you.")

What the movies, and the television shows, and the novels, and ¾ most emphatically! ¾ the judges do not tell you is the most important thing about the jury. The jury represents the county. The counties created their State, just as the States created the U. S.; the county is the highest power known (the highest civil power, that is). The county, in the persons of the jury, must take responsibility for the State; it is the responsibility of the jury to make sure that the court follows the Law (the judge may say, speaking to the jury, that it is his responsibility ¾ but no court has ever dared so to say in a written opinion. Even before the Revolution it was settled that the jury finds the law. No American has had less regard for Law than Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., but he it was who wrote "the jury has the power to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both law and facts." [Horning vs. District of Columbia, 1920, 254 U. S. 135, 138].) To be plain ¾ if the State has written a law, a statute, then the jury must assure themselves that the State has written it truthfully; if the State has not understood this particular set of circumstances, then the statute cannot control the court, the law followed by the court can only be the Law understood by all.

Occasionally, I hear the criticism, "That is not the Law: that is what the law ought to be." I reply, "Compared to what

OUGHT the law to be?" Hitherto, my critics have been satisfied.

Do not imagine that there is anything strange about this. Firstly, it has been the law of the land for as long as there has been any law. Secondly, this is the very nature of science, of discovery ¾ one proposes a theory true for all cases, i.e. a law, and then tests to see whether it fits the facts in this case and that case. The legislature made a guess at a theory which, they supposed, would be good in every case, but to test the theory in the case of Black and in the case of Brown must be the work of the courts.

In 1997, a U. S. Court of Appeal reportedly ruled against "jury nullification." However, the facts hardly presented an instance of jury nullification; apparently, one juror made no attempt to reason with the remainder, but rather chose to be in a minority of one. This is not so much jury-nullification as jury-hanging. One might add that those courts which describe a hung jury as a mistrial, and therefore allow a second trial, are grotesquely mistaken; whether there has or has not been a mistrial ¾ some departure from the process due ¾ is a question to be settled before , not after, the case is referred to the jury. If, when the case has been duly presented, twelve reasonable men are not convinced, then the case has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt ¾ period.

What do you do if the judge insists that he knows best? Usually, the judge doesn’t lie openly; he asks, "Do you understand that I tell you what the law is? You only have to judge the facts." If you say, "No!", then presumably he will refuse to have you in his court ¾ otherwise he would look a fool. If all the judges in all the courts refuse to have you on a jury, then presumably the other jurors will wake up to the fact t