Society and the Individual


ANY questions, we have seen, can be attacked only by asking someone else whether he agrees. And we have seen that on certain questions, scientific ones, agreement can exist today but disappear tomorrow. What does this tentative, conjectural nature of agreement mean for society?

First of all, it means that the individual must be free to change his mind, to say today something other than what he said yesterday. Secondly, we can make a guess that it is little use asking your twin sibling or your best friend whether he agrees with you; you want confirmation from someone with a contrasted experience.

If the society proceeds merely by finding a proposition, or motion, on which all can agree, then it has adopted the philosophy of humanism†, i.e. truth is freedom from objection. It is not necessarily true that the consensus today will uphold whatever position was taken by the consensus yesterday; someone may have had a new idea (or a new experience.) However, if the question being argued is prejudicial to any individual ¾ "Did not his cattle graze on my land?" ¾ that individual will presumably raise an objection if a decision against him would be inconsistent with any previous decision. Thus some kinds of decisions may be expected to be consistent from one occasion to another.

The popular term for such a society is "direct democracy" (implying that "democracy," in the strict sense, comes into being when the collective has some agent at its command.) This system is familiar under another name; "polite society." The convention is well understood; one asks, "Does anyone mind . . . ?" before acting. Thus the society is essentially negative, each of the members has a veto. It is indeed possible for two, or three, or more, persons to share a bank account if a cheque requires all of their signatures to be valid. A bank account from which many persons can draw funds individually, however, escapes the imagination: the difficulty of finding out whether any of the others had made a withdrawal would outweigh the advantage of being entitled to draw a cheque oneself. Furthermore, the bank might raise the question, who would be responsible for any overdrafts?

In principle, each member of such a society equally will have his own way; one who wants something extraordinary ¾ perhaps, that everyone be quiet while he listens to his record player ¾ may get his way only rarely, but he cannot be denied the occasional indulgence, because he has a veto over the things that all the others propose to do. Nevertheless, there will be a tendency for the society to divide up; there will be some whose choices will exclude the choices of others, those who like the windows open will dissociate from those who like the windows shut. (They can both be satisfied once the possibility of having the windows open in one place and shut in another prevails.)

Today, it is widely believed that law and order are incompatible concepts, because law can only be created by a society of equals and order is absent among equals. However, it is easy to show that this belief is false. Imagine a society in which there is seniority ¾ every member is given a number at entry, and numbers are issued in sequence. Suppose further that, when a question is put, the roll of the members is called in order of diminishing numbers ¾ that is, the latest entrant speaks first. Then there would indubitably be an order; it would also be indubitable which was the desirable end of the order, because the first member to speak might find subsequently that he was in a minority of one, but the last to speak has the choice of taking or rejecting that distinction. Thus, if an assembly proceeds by consensus, each member has just as much influence as the president ¾ the latter is indeed primus inter pares.

Consider what is the mode of failure of such a society. It is hardly to be feared that something will be proposed which is mistaken, and no-one will know that it is mistaken ¾ at least in any fairly large number of persons, someone will oppose such an innovation merely because he does not understand it (i. e. "conservatism" in the vulgar sense of the word). But there is a danger that something will be proposed that one or a few persons know is mistaken, but the few will fail to stand up in opposition to the many. There is a danger that someone will understand that some action is necessary, but be afraid to insist that he be heard . . . . Thus we see that what destroys the society, as a forum for exposing errors, is for any one to doubt his equality, for one or more members to feel that they are not (individually) responsible.

This argument remains valid even if the society does not proceed by consensus. Suppose that the criterion for decision [in political questions] is 50% + 1: i.e. a vote of 217 to 217 fails, but one of 218 to 217 passes. Then, plainly, it is necessary to ensure that every vote is equally good ¾ if one of the 218 in favor had coerced another into voting with him, the motion in fact failed by 217 to 218.

We have now introduced a new concept. Hitherto we have discussed only whether a proposition is true or false; but in saying that it is "necessary" for the ballot to be free, we have raised the question whether an action is right or wrong.

It is not difficult to see why it is wrong for one or more members to coerce another; the remainder of the members are acting in the belief that every member is voting freely, the few who are coercing one other are invalidating this reasonable belief. The coercion is effective particularly in so far as it is unknown to the remainder.

There is, then, no inherent difficulty with the terms "right" and "wrong;" the question, "Does is imply ought?" can be answered ¾ if the apple is mine, "you ought not" [meaning, "for you it is wrong"] to eat it.

The significance of "right," or at least "wrong," is already plain: it is, that the society is required to defend its members against wrongdoing.

Righteousness†

 

Is this ethic of righteousness or fraternit醾 variously called collective security among nations, common defense among the States, solidarity† among persons ¾ merely a relationship that exists in debating societies, or does it prevail among equals as a law? To claim that it is self-evident is to claim that any other theory denies equality among A, B, C, D, E, F, et al. And this can indeed be shown.

Let us suppose that A attacks B, and C et al observe the act. Suppose further that A and B are equals, so that it is wrong for A so to act. Then there are four courses of action open to C et al. First, they could remain neutral. Second, they could join B against A . Third, they could join A against B. Finally, they could be "positively neutral," and attack both A and B .

Now consider the case in which C et al also are equal to B. Then, because it is wrong for A to attack B, it must also be wrong for C or D to do so. Thus the third and fourth courses must be excluded. However, because A has acted as if he were not an equal of B (or C ), he can have no objection to C joining with B. Thus there remain two courses, neutrality and joining the defender; are both of these open to C ?

Consider now an alternative scenario, in which A and B agree to have a battle. In this case, A and B are in all respects equal, so that the same argument excludes three of the courses of action open to C et al ¾ the only one remaining to them is, to remain neutral. If, then, C et al remain neutral when A attacks B, they are behaving as if A had consent to his attack, as if A were justified. And, history affirms, an aggressor indeed asks nothing more than that other parties remain neutral.

Thus we see that it is not right to remain neutral, to do nothing; so to do is to take the side of the aggressor.

Unsurprisingly, ethical teaching is found in the Scriptures of the Jews and Christians. Leviticus 19:16: "Neither shalt thou stand idly by the blood of thy neighbor." Mt. 12:30: "He who is not with me is against me." The seemingly contrary teaching in Mk. 9:40 and Lk. 9:50, "He that is not against us is on our part," refers to a context in which nothing wrong had been done. (Although the Church of Rome does not practice democracy, the principle is smuggled in under the doctrine of "subsidiarity" ¾ i.e. States’ rights.)

In life, Jesus taught in an occupied territory, and the teaching was presented accordingly. The much-quoted saying "Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s, and unto God . . . ." (Mt. 22:19, Mk. 12:14, Lk. 20:22) was prefaced by the demand "Show me the tribute money:" every Jew held that an object bearing the image of a man was unclean, the Pharisees sent a gentile servant to fetch a Roman coin ¾ the meaning, they well knew, was "Render unto Caesar what does not belong to God."

It is now known that the resurrected Jesus has renewed His teaching. "The Gospel Delivered in Ares" is sharply more explicit and emphatic in condemning, as enemies of liberty, both the Black Prince (Caesar, the sword) and the White Prince (institutional religion, the witch doctor.) See The Revelation of Arès, Fr. Michel Potay, Maison de la Revelation [1995] (available from Bookworld, Sarasota, Florida.)

The Libertarian† theory, viz. that C may choose between neutrality and joining the defender, would entail that C was constrained when peace prevailed, but had freedom of action when wrong was done ¾ C would have a vested interest in aggression (amongst other entities). The only case in which C et al are not obligated is that in which A and B are not equals, but, say, man and animal, or minor and guardian.

We see, then, that it is far from true that the society endows rights on the member; it would be wrong for A to attack B, even if they were alone on a desert island. The point is thus: that if A attacks B, or even threatens B, he does not attack B and only B; he attacks the society as a whole; if B is no longer independent of A, the society has lost one of the minds upon which it was, and still is, relying.

Let us note that this argument does not constitute a theory as to what any individual "should" do. If A and B were adult males, and C a young female, it could not be concluded that C should intervene between A and B. What the argument does settle is what the overwhelming majority shall do. The theory is, then, a useful one; the individual badly needs to be able to predict the actions of the overwhelming majority, the state† ¾ such is a proper subject of law.

And let us note particularly that the overwhelming majority ¾ the state, or the county ¾ is not the equal of the individual. The state does only what C and D et al are required to do; it is their agent, acting under their authority.

This point ¾ that the collective is not the equal of the individual ¾ is today regarded as debatable; a state is treated as a person, competent to dispose of property. However, if my gamekeeper allows my birds to be poached, or even entices my spouse away, this mishap is just the cost of doing business. If, on the other hand, there is some task I am obliged to do at the cost of losing my standing in society, I do not entrust it to just anyone: at the very least, I insist that whoever undertakes to do it on my behalf has no interests of his own, or of other persons’, that could conceivably interfere with his doing my bidding. I do not admit him to equality; I demand obedience.

We have now answered the main, if not the only, question posed by ethics, viz. who are to be admitted among Us? The answer is, that one is sovereign† (independent) if one accepts the obligation to take up arms (as necessary) if and when the rights of an equal are threatened.

We have seen also that this ethical theory is sufficient to specify what the state shall do ¾ it is, then, not merely a law, but the [axiom of] Law.

The ethic of solidarity is rejected by "conservatives," who argue that there are no collective experiences, that the only thing in common between individuals is that they are created by one God, so that the only proper collective activity is worship. Thus Carson, in Organized Against Whom?: The Labor Union in America (Western Goals, Alexandria, VA: 1983), concludes that labor unions are religious organizations. And the "conserv